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Abstract We propose and analyze a class of integrated social and quality of service (QoS)
trust-based routing protocols in mobile ad-hoc delay tolerant networks. The underlying idea
is to incorporate trust evaluation in the routing protocol, considering not only QoS trust
properties but also social trust properties to evaluate other nodes encountered. We prove that
our protocol is resilient against bad-mouthing, good-mouthing and whitewashing attacks
performed by malicious nodes. By utilizing a stochastic Petri net model describing a delay
tolerant network consisting of heterogeneous mobile nodes with vastly different social and
networking behaviors, we analyze the performance characteristics of trust-based routing
protocols in terms of message delivery ratio, message delay, and message overhead against
connectivity-based, epidemic and PROPHET routing protocols. The results indicate that our
trust-basedroutingprotocolsoutperformPROPHETandcanapproachtheidealperformance
obtainable by epidemic routing in delivery ratio and message delay, without incurring high
message overhead. Further, integrated social and QoS trust-based protocols can effectively
tradeoffmessagedelayforasignificantgaininmessagedeliveryratioandmessageoverhead
over traditional connectivity-based routing protocols.
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1 Introduction
A delay tolerant network (DTN) provides interoperable communications through mobile
nodes with the characteristics of high end-to-end path latency, frequent disconnection, lim-
ited resources (e.g., battery, computational power, bandwidth), and unreliable wireless trans-
mission. Further, for DTNs in mobile ad hoc network (MANET) environments, we also
face additional challenges due to a lack of centralized trusted entity and this increases secu-
rity vulnerability [1]. For a sparse MANET DTN, mobility-assisted routing based on store-
carry-and-forward method has been used. That is, a message carrier forwards a message to
an encountered node until the message reaches a destination node. In MANET DTN envi-
ronments, it is important to select a trustworthy node as a next message carrier among all
encountered nodes to minimize the delay for a message to reach a destination node as well
as to maximize the message delivery ratio. In this paper, we consider a MANET DTN in the
presenceofselfishandmaliciousnodesandproposeafamilyoftrust-basedroutingprotocols
to select a highly trustworthy next message carrier with the goal of maximizing the message
delivery ratio without incurring a high delay or a high message overhead.
In the literature, DTN routing protocols based on encounter patterns have been investi-
gated [2–4]. However, if the predicted encounter does not happen, then messages would be
lost for single-copy routing, or ﬂooded for multi-copy routing. Moreover, these approaches
could not guarantee reliable message delivery due to the presence of selfish or malicious
nodes. The vulnerability of DTN routing to node selfishness was well studied in [5,6]. Sev-
eral recent studies [7–9] considered using reputation in selecting message carriers among
encountered nodes for DTNs. Nevertheless, [7,9] assumed that a centralized entity exists for
credit management,and[8] merelyusedreputationto judgeif thesystem shouldswitch from
reputation-based routing to multipath routing when many selfish nodes exist.
ThereisverylittleresearchtodateonthesocialaspectoftrustmanagementforDTNrout-
ing. Social relationship and social networking were considered as criteria to select message
carriers in a MANET DTN [10,11]. However, no consideration was given to the presence of
malicious or selfish nodes. Very recently, [12] considered routing by socially selfish nodes
in DTNs, taking into consideration the willingness of a socially selfish node to forward mes-
sages to the destination node because of social ties. Unlike prior work cited above, in this
paper, we integrate social trust and Quality of Service (QoS) trust into a composite trust
metric for determining the best node among the new encounters for message forwarding,
extending from our preliminary work [13]. We consider honesty and unselfishness for social
trust to account for a node’s trustworthiness for message delivery, and connectivity for QoS
trust to accountforanode’scapability to quicklydeliver themessageto thedestination node.
By assigning various weights associated with these QoS and social trust properties, we form
a class of DTN routing protocols, from which we examine two versions of the trust man-
agement protocol in this paper: an equal-weight QoS and social trust management protocol
(called trust-based routing for short) and a QoS trust only management protocol (called con-
nectivity-basedroutingforshort).Weanalyzeandcomparetheperformancecharacteristicsof
trust-based routing and connectivity-based routing protocols with epidemic routing [14]a n d
PROPHET [15] for a DTN consisting of heterogeneous mobile nodes with vastly different
social and networking behaviors. The results indicate that our trust-based routing protocols
outperformPROPHETandcanapproachtheidealperformanceobtainablebyepidemicrout-
ing in delivery ratio and message delay, without incurring high message overhead. Further,
integrated social and QoS trust-based protocols can effectively trade off message delay for
a significant gain in message delivery ratio and message overhead over connectivity-based
routing protocols.
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2 System Model
We consider a MANET DTN environment with no centralized trusted authority. Nodes com-
municate through multiple hops. Every node may have a different level of energy and speed
reﬂecting node heterogeneity. We differentiate selfish nodes from malicious nodes. A selfish
node acts for its own interest. So it may drop packets arbitrarily just to save energy but it may
decide to forward a packet if it has good social ties with the destination node. A malicious
node acts maliciously with the intention to disrupt the main functionality of the DTN, so it
can drop packets, jam the wireless channel, perform bad-mouthing attacks (provide negative
recommendations against good nodes), perform good-mouthing attacks (provide positive
recommendations for other colluding malicious nodes) and even forge packets. In the paper,
wewillusethetermsamaliciousnode,acompromisednode,andabadnodeinterchangeably.
We consider the following model to describe a node’s behaviors. If a node is selfish, the
speed of energy consumption is slowed down and vice versa. If a node is compromised, the
speed of energy consumption will increase since the node may have a chance to perform
attacks which may consume more energy, e.g., disseminating bogus messages. We also con-
sider redemption mechanism for a selfish node to have a second chance. That is, a selfish
node may become unselfish again, especially when its energy is still high compared with its
peers. We assume that each node has a pair of pre-distributed public/private keys which can
be used for packet authentication and preventing spoofing attacks.
A node’s trust value is assessed based on direct observations and indirect information like
recommendations. The trust of one node toward another node is updated upon encounter
events. Our trust metric consists of two trust types: QoS trust and social trust. QoS trust is
evaluated through the communication by the capability of a node to deliver messages to the
destination node. We consider connectivity to measure the QoS trust level of a node. Social
trust is based on social relationships. We consider unselfishness and honesty to measure the
social trust level of a node. Different from most existing encounter-based routing protocols
which considered only connectivity, we consider social trust in addition to QoS trust in order
to select moretrustworthy messagecarriers amongencountered nodes.It is worth noting that
unselfishness traditionally has been considered as a QoS trust metric [16] to measure the
extent to which a node cooperates with other nodes to conform to protocol execution. Here
we consider unselfishness as a social trust metric to measure if a node is socially willing
to route packets passed to it in a DTN, thereby modeling the social behavior exhibited by
a selfish node. We deﬁne a node’s trust level as a real number in the range of [0, 1], with 1
indicating complete trust, 0.5 ignorance, and 0 complete distrust.
There is no centralized intrusion detection system (IDS) as it may be infeasible to imple-
ment an efﬁcient IDS in a DTN environment because of the sparseness of nodes and small
chances for certain nodes to encounter or connect to each other. Each node will execute the
trust protocol independently and will perform its direct trust assessment toward an encoun-
tered node based on speciﬁc detection mechanisms designed for detecting a trust property X,
with X = connectivity, unselfishness, or honesty. In the paper, we will discuss these speciﬁc
detection mechanisms employed in our protocol.
3 Trust Management for Message Routing
Thetrustvalueofnodej asevaluatedbynodei attimet,denotedasTi,j (t),iscomputedbya
weighted average of connectivity, honesty, and unselfishness trust components. Specifically
node i will compute Ti,j (t) by:
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Ti,j (t) = w1T
e−connectivity
i,j (t) + w2T
d−connectivity
i,j (t) + w3T
honesty
i,j (t)
+w4T
unselfishness
i,j (t) (1)
where w1 : w2 : w3 : w4 is the weight ratio with w1 + w2 + w3 + w4 = 1. Of these trust
components (or properties) in Eq. 1, T
e−connectivity
i,j (t) is about node i’s belief in node i’s
encounter connectivity to node j, representing the delay of node i passing the message to
node j,T
d−connectivity
i,j (t) is about node i’s belief in node j’s connectivity to the destination
node d, representing the delay of node j passing the message to node d,T
honesty
i,j (t) is about
node i’s belief in node j’s honesty, and T
unselfishness
i,j (t) is about node i’s belief in node j’s
unselfishness.
The reason of considering both e-connectivity and d-connectivity trust properties in our
protocol is given as follows. The end-to-end delay from node i’s perspective consists of the
e-connectivity delay from node i to node j (the next carrier) and the d-connectivity delay
from node j to node d (the destination node). Thus, both connectivity metrics are needed.
Suppose d-connectivity is only trust metric for connectivity. If node i encounters node j and
discovers that node j’s d-connectivity delay is higher than another node’s (say node m’s)
d-connectivity delay, then node i will decide not to pass the message to node j. This would
be a wrong decision in case node m’s e-connectivity delay + d-connectivity delay actually is
higher than node j’s e-connectivity delay (which is zero upon encounter) + d-connectivity
delay. Here we note two special cases: (1) if node j is the currently encountered node, then
T
e−connectivity
i,j (t) is one, representing that the e-connectivity delay is zero; (2) if node d is
the currently encountered node, then both T
e−connectivity
i,j (t) and T
d−connectivity
i,j (t) are one,
representing that both the e-connectivity delay and d-connectivity delay are zero.
In message forwarding in DTNs, two most important performance metrics are mes-
sage delivery ratio and delay. The rationale of using these four trust metrics is to rank
nodes such that high T
e−connectivity
i,j (t) and T
d−connectivity
i,j (t) represent low end-to-end
delay, while high T
honesty
i,j (t) and T
unselfishness
i,j (t) represent high delivery ratio. We set
T
e−connectivity
i,j (0),T
d−connectivity
i,j (0),T
honesty
i,j (0)andT
unselfishness
i,j (0)toignorance(0.5)
since initially there is no information exchanged among nodes.
WedeﬁneaminimumtrustthresholdTmin alsosettoignorance(0.5)suchthatifTi,j (t) >
Tmin,nodei willconsidernodej as“trustworthy”(orplainlyasagoodnode)attimet.When
node i encounters another node, say node m, it exchanges its encounter history with node m.
Moreover,ifnodei believesthatnodemisagoodnode,i.e.,Ti,m (t +  t) >T min,where t
is the encounterperiod,nodei will usenodem asa recommenderto updateits beliefs toward
other nodes. Specifically, node i will update its trust toward node j upon encountering node
m at time t for a duration of  t as follows:
T X
i,j (t +  t) = β1T
direct,X
i,j (t +  t) + β2T
indirect,X
i,j (t +  t) (2)
HereX referstoatrustproperty(e-connectivity,d-connectivity,honesty,orunselfishness)
with:
T
direct,X
i,j (t +  t) =
 
T
encounter,X
i,m (t +  t),i f m = j
T X
i,j (t),i f m  = j
(3)
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T
indirect,X
i,j (t +  t)
=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
T X
i,m (t),i f m = j
T X
i,j (t),i f m  = ja n dT i,m (t +  t) ≤ Tmin
T X
i,m (t +  t) × T X
m,j (t +  t),i f m  = ja n dT i,m (t +  t) >T min
(4)
In Eq. 2, β1 is a weight parameter to weigh node i’s own trust assessment toward node
j at time t +  t, i.e., “self-information,” and β2 is a weight parameter to weigh indirect
information from the recommender, i.e., “other-information,” with β1 + β2 = 1.
In Eq. 3 for the direct trust calculation of node j, if the new encounter (node m) is node
j itself, then node i can directly evaluate node j.W eu s eT
encounter,X
i,m (t +  t) to denote
the assessment result of node i toward node m in trust property X based on node i’s past
experienceswithnodemuptotimet+ t.ThismeansthatthevalueofT
encounter,X
i,m (t +  t)
is assessed based on node i’s direct observations to node m collected while they encountered
with each other (including the current encounter) over the time period [0,t +  t]. Later
in Sect. 5, we will describe how this can be obtained for each trust property X. If the new
encounter is not node j, then there is no new direct information can be gained about node j,
so node i will just use its past trust toward node j obtained at time t.
In Eq. 4 for the indirect trust calculation of node j, if the new encounter is node j itself,
then there is no indirect recommendation for node j, so node i will just use its past trust
obtained at time t. If the new encounter is not node j, then node m can provide its recom-
mendation to node i for evaluating node j, if node i considers node m as trustworthy, i.e.,
Ti,m (t +  t) >T min. In this case, we must take into account node i’s belief in node m in the
calculation of T
indirect,X
i,j (t +  t). This models the decay of trust as trust is derived from
a distant node as indirect information. On the other hand, if node i does not consider node
m as a good node because of Ti,m (t +  t) ≤ Tmin, then node i refuses to take recommen-
dations from node m about node j, and will just use its past trust information about node
j obtained at time t. The policy that recommendations from a newly encounter node are
accepted only if the newly encountered node is considered a good node provides robustness
against bad-mouthing or good-mouthing attacks.
Ti,j (t) in Eq. 1 can be used by node i (if it is a message carrier) to decide, upon encoun-
tering node m, if it should forward the message to node m with the intent to shorten the
message delay or improve the message delivery ratio. We consider a  –permissible policy
in this paper, i.e., node i will pass the message to node m if Ti,m (t) is in the top   percentile
among all Ti,j (t)  s. We experiment with various values of   to trade message delivery ratio
with message latency.
4 Protocol Resiliency
Below we provide a formal proof that our trust management protocol is resilient against
malicious attacks, including whitewashing attacks (a bad node washing away its bad repu-
tation by gaining high trust upon encountering with another node), bad-mouthing attacks (a
bad node providing bad recommendations toward a good node to ruin its reputation), and
good-mouthing attacks (a bad node providing good recommendations for a colluding bad
node to raise its reputation).
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4.1 Resiliency to Whitewashing Attacks
Deﬁnition 1 A bad node, say node m, upon encountering node i at time t for an encoun-
ter interval  t, is said to perform a whitewashing attack successfully against node i if
Ti,m (t) ≤ Tmin and Ti,m (t +  t) >T min.
Lemma 1 Our protocol is resilient against whitewashing attacks.
Proof When node i encounters node m at time t for a duration of  t, according to our
protocol Ti,m (t +  t) = β1T encounter
i,m (t +  t) + β2Ti,m (t),o fw h i c hTi,m (t) ≤ Tmin is
given (in the if part) and T encounter
i,m (t +  t) ≤ Tmin is true because node i will be able
to observe node m’s bad behavior directly based on node i’s past experiences with node m
up to time t +  t, including the current encounter. Taking the fact that β1 + β2 = 1, we
obtain Ti,m (t +  t) ≤ Tmin. Thus, it is impossible that a bad node can successfully perform
a whitewashing attack.    
4.2 Resiliency to Bad-Mouthing Attacks
Deﬁnition 2 A bad node, say node m, upon encountering node i at time t for an encounter
interval  t, is said to perform a bad-mouthing attack successfully against a good node, say
node j,i fTi,j (t) >T min and Ti,j (t +  t) ≤ Tmin.
Lemma 2 Our protocol is resilient against bad-mouthing attacks.
Proof The proof hinges on proving Ti,m (t +  t) ≤ Tmin and therefore node i will refuse
to take recommendations from node m about node j. Utilizing the proof to Lemma 1 and
the fact that Ti,m (t) ≤ Tmin is true (because we set the initial trust value to ignorance, i.e.,
Ti,m (0) = Tmin, making it impossible for a bad node to gain trustworthy status at time t),
we know Ti,m (t +  t) ≤ Tmin is true. Consequently, node i will not take recommendations
fromnodemaboutnodej.Accordingtoourprotocol,Ti,j (t +  t) = β1Ti,j (t)+β2Ti,j (t).
This leads to Ti,j (t +  t) >T min because β1 + β2 = 1a n dTi,j (t) >T min is given (in the
if part). Therefore, it is impossible that a bad node can successfully perform a bad-mouthing
attack.    
4.3 Resiliency to Good-Mouthing Attacks
Deﬁnition 3 A bad node, say node m, upon encountering node i at time t for an encounter
interval  t, is said to perform a good-mouthing attack successfully for a bad node, say node
k,i fTi,k (t) ≤ Tmin and Ti,k (t +  t) >T min.
Lemma 3 Our protocol is resilient against good-mouthing attacks.
Proof Following the proof to Lemma 1, we know that Ti,m (t +  t) ≤ Tmin is true. Hence,
node i refuses to take recommendations from node m about node k and Ti,k (t +  t) =
β1Ti,k (t)+β2Ti,k (t) according to our protocol. This leads to Ti,k (t +  t) ≤ Tmin because
β1 + β2 = 1a n dTi,k (t) ≤ Tmin is given (in the if part). Therefore, it is impossible that a
bad node can successfully perform a good-mouthing attack.    
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5 Performance Model
We analyze the performance of the proposed trust-based routing protocol for DTN message
forwarding by a probability model based on stochastic Petri net (SPN) techniques [17] due
to its ability to handle a large number of states.
5.1 SPN Model to Yield Ground Truth
WedevelopanSPNmodeltoyielddynamicgroundtruthinformationofnodesintheexample
DTN described in Sect. 2. The SPN model is shown in Fig. 1. The SPN model describes a
node’slifetimeinthepresenceofselfishandmaliciousnodes.Itisusedtoobtaineachnode’s
information(e.g.,connectivity,honesty,andunselfishness)andtoderivethetrustrelationship
with other nodes in the system.
Without loss of generality, we consider a square-shaped operational area consisting of
m × m sub-grid areas with the width and height equal to the radio range (R). Initially nodes
are randomly distributed over the operational area based on uniform distribution. A node
randomly moves to one of four locations in four directions (i.e., north, west, south, and east)
in accordance with its mobility rate. To avoid end-effects, movement is wrapped around (i.e.,
a torus is assumed). The SPN model produces the probability that a node, say node i,i si na
particular location L at time t. This information along with the location information of other
nodes at time t (derived from these nodes’ SPN models) provides us the probability of two
nodes encountering with each other, and how often two nodes exchange encounter histories
to update T X
i,j (t).
Below we explain how we construct the SPN model for describing a node’s behavior in
terms of its location, energy, honesty, and selfishness status.
5.1.1 Location
Transition T_LOCATION is triggered when the node moves to a randomly selected area out
of four different directions from its current location with the rate being calculated as σ/R
based on its speed σ and wireless radio range R.
5.1.2 Connectivity
Connectivity of node i to node j is measured by the time-averaged probability that node i
and node j are within one-hop during [0,t+  t]. This can be obtained by knowledge of
location probabilities of node i and node j during [0,t+  t].
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5.1.3 Energy
Place Energy represents the current energy level of a node. An initial energy level of each
node is assigned according to node heterogeneity information. A token is taken out when
transition T_ENERGY ﬁres. The transition rate of T_ENERGY is adjusted on the ﬂy based
on a node’s state. It is lower when a node is selfish to save energy; it is higher when the
node is compromised so that it performs attacks more and consumes energy more. We use
the energy model in [16] to adjust the rate to consume one token in place Energy based on a
node’s state.
5.1.4 Honesty
A node is either good or bad. We distinguish a bad (or compromised) node from a good
node by placing a token in place CN. A bad node can perform various attacks including
white washing, good mouthing and bad mouthing attacks, thus exhibiting dishonest behav-
iors. When a node encounters another node, it will perform a direct trust assessment of the
encounterednodeinthehonesttrustpropertybasedonspeciﬁcdetectionmechanismsdevised
for detecting dishonesty (to be described later).
5.1.5 Selfishness
Place SN represents whether a node is selfish or not. If a node becomes selfish, a token goes
to SN by triggering T_SELFISH. We model a node’s selfish behavior as a function of its
remaining energy. Specifically, the transition rate to T_SELFISH is given by:
rate(T_SELFISH) =
f (Eremain)
 t
(5)
where  t is the duration between two encountering events over which a node may decide
to become selfish. The form f (y) = α1y−ε1 follows the demand-pricing relationship in
Economics [18] to model the effect of its argument y on the selfishness behavior, such that
f(E remain) models the behavior that a node with a higher level of energy is less likely to be
selfish.SimilarlyaselfishnodemaybecomeunselfishagainthroughtransitionT_REDEMP.
The redemption rate is modeled in a similar way as:
rate(T_REDEMP) =
g (Econsumed)
 t
(6)
where g (y) = α2y−ε2 and Econsumed is the amount of energy consumed as given by E0 −
Eremain and  t is the encountering interval over which a selfish node may decide to become
unselfish again. g (Econsumed) models the behavior that a node with a lower level of energy
will more likely stay selfish to further save its energy considering its own individual beneﬁt.
5.2 Trust Assessment
Leveraging the SPN model described which yields ground truth information of node i’s sta-
tus, we can calculate T X
i,j (t +  t) as follows. In practice, T X
i,j (t +  t) is obtained by node i
by following the protocol execution at runtime. The computational procedure devised below
is to predict T X
i,j (t +  t) that would be obtained by node i. Our assertion is that the detec-
tion mechanisms used by a node for trust assessment of property X of an encountered node
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will be effective and fairly accurate. Thus, T
encounter,X
i,m (t +  t) assessed by node i will be
close to ground truth. Consequently, T
encounter,X
i,m (t +  t) is predicted to be the same as the
ground truth status of node m in trust property X, as provided from the SPN output. Below
we discuss speciﬁc detection mechanisms used by node i to assess node m upon encounter
to satisfy the assertion.
• T
encounter,e−connectivity
i,m (t +  t): This refers to the belief of node i about its connectivity
to node m based on node i’s encountering experiences. The speciﬁc detection mech-
anism used is counter-based. That is, node i keeps track of the numbers of encoun-
ters it has had with all other nodes in the DTN up to time t +  t and computes
T
encounter,e−connectivity
i,m (t +  t) by the ratio of the number of encounters between node
i and node m to the maximum number of encounters between node i and any other node
during [0,t+  t].
• T
encounter,d−connectivity
i,m (t +  t):Thisreferstothebeliefofnodei abouttheconnectivity
between node m and node d based on node i’s encountering experiences. The speciﬁc
detection mechanism used is also counter-based. It can be computed by the ratio of the
numberofencountersbetweennodemandnoded tothemaximumnumberofencounters
between node d and any other node over the time period [0,t+  t] all based on node
i’s observations. Note that node i can observe node m encountering node d only if both
node m and node d are within 1-hop range of node i. Thus, by consulting its encounter
history with all nodes, node i will be able to calculate T
encounter,d−connectivity
i,m (t +  t)
for the connectivity of node m to node d.
• T
encounter,honesty
i,m (t +  t): This refers to the belief of node i that node m is honest based
on direct observation experiences with node m during encounters. Since a compromised
node will perform attacks and exhibit dishonest behaviors, the speciﬁc mechanisms used
are anomaly detection or intrusion detection techniques [19,20]. Specifically, node i
monitors node m’s dishonest evidences including dishonest trust recommendation, irreg-
ular packet patterns, and abnormal trafﬁc while they encountered including the current
encounter. Then it computes T
encounter,honesty
i,m (t +  t) by the ratio of the number of bad
honesty experiences to the total number of honesty experiences.
• T
encounter,unselfishness
i,m (t +  t): This refers to the belief of node i that node m is willing
to deliver messages. In traditional MANETs, a node’s selfishness can be detected by
using snooping and overhearing techniques. However, in DTNs messages are delivered
in a store-and-forward fashion, thus snooping and overhearing may not be feasible. Our
speciﬁc detection mechanism for detecting unselfishness is signature-based, leveraging
the private/public keys for message authentication. Specifically, when node i encounters
nodej andpassesamessagetonodej,ifnodej isnotselfishitwillforward themessage
and acknowledge node i with the same message signed with its private key. Afterwards,
when node i and node m encounter each other, they exchange message signatures and
verify each exchanged message signature by the receiver’s public key. Since each mes-
sage is unique, a bad node cannot apply replication attacks. An unselfish node therefore
will have more veriﬁed message signatures than a selfish node. Node i then computes
T
encounter,unselfishness
i,m (t +  t)bytheratioofthenumberofveriﬁedmessagesignatures
received from node m to the maximum number of veriﬁed message signatures received
from any other node.
As a result of applying the above detection mechanisms for trust property X,
T
encounter,X
i,m (t +  t) obtained by node i would be close to the ground truth status of
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Table 1 Default parameter
values used
Param Value
m × m 8 × 8
α1 4
E0 [12,24]h
R 250m
α2 0.5
  90%
Tmin 0.5
ε1,ε2 1.6
 t 300s
σ [0, 2]m/s
β1 : β2 0.8:0.2
N 20
node m at time t which can be easily obtained from the SPN model output. In particu-
lar, T
encounter,honesty
i,m (t +  t) in Eq. 3 is simply equal to the probability that place CN does
not contain a token at time t +  t, and T
encounter,unselfishness
i,m (t +  t) is simply equal to
the probability that place SN does not contain a token at time t +  t, both of which can
be computed easily from the SPN model output. Similarly, T
encounter,e−connectivity
i,m (t +  t)
is simply equal to the time-averaged probability that node i and node m are within one-
hop during [0,t+  t] and T
encounter,d−connectivity
i,m (t +  t) is equal to the time-averaged
probability that node m and node d are within one-hop during [0,t+  t], both of which
can be obtained by utilizing the SPN model output regarding the node location probability.
OnceT
encounter,X
i,m (t +  t)isobtainedateachencountertime,nodei computesT X
i,j (t +  t)
based on Eq. 2, and subsequently, obtains Ti,j (t +  t) based on Eq. 1.
6R e s u l t s
Below we show numerical results and provide physical interpretation of the results obtained.
Table 1 lists the default parameter values used. For trust-based routing, we set w1 : w2 : w3 :
w4 = 0.25 : 0.25 : 0.25 : 0.25 for e-connectivity: d-connectivity: honesty: unselfishness,
while for connectivity-based routing, we set w1 : w2 : w3 : w4 = 0.5 : 0.5 : 0 : 0. We setup
N = 20 nodes with vastly different initial energy levels in the system moving randomly in
a8× 8 operational region with the speed of each node in the range of [0,2]m/s, and with
each area covering 250m radio radius. There are two sets of nodes, namely, good nodes and
bad nodes, and we vary the percentage of bad nodes to test their effect on the performance
of our protocol. A good node may become selfish to save energy and unselfish again after
redemption,withtheselfishratedeﬁnedbasedonEq.5andredemptionratedeﬁnedbyEq.6.
Theinitialtrustlevelissettoignorance(i.e.,0.5)foralltrustcomponentssinceinitiallynodes
do not know each other. We also set Tmin to 0.5 so that a node will take recommendations
from a newly encountered node only when its trust level toward the newly encountered node
exceeds ignorance.
To reveal which trust component might have a more dominant effect, we show
T
e−connectivity
i,j (t),T
d−connectivity
i,j (t),T
honesty
i,j (t) and T
unselfishness
i,j (t) for node i (a good
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Fig. 2 Comparing T X
i,j (t) as a Function of Time. a Node j is a good node. b Node j is a bad node
node) evaluating node j randomly picked. Other nodes exhibit similar trends and thus only
one set of results is shown. Figure 2a is for the case in which node j is a good node. We see
that all trust components exhibit the same trend. A good node initially picks up its trustwor-
thy status (with its trust level greater than Tmin) due to favorable direct evaluations by those
nodes it encounters and interacts with, who in turn pass on their positive recommendations
to other nodes they encounter. All trust components after their respectively maximum val-
ues then decline as time progresses because malicious negative recommendations from bad
nodes performing bad-mouthing attacks gradually pick up advantages against positive rec-
ommendations from good nodes. Among all trust components, the honesty trust component
is expected to contribute the most to the trustworthy status of a good node. This is reﬂected
in Fig. 2a which shows honesty dominates other trust components.
Figure2bshowsT
e−connectivity
i,j (t),T
d−connectivity
i,j (t),T
honesty
i,j (t)andT
unselfishness
i,j (t)
as a function of time for the case in which node j is a bad node. Here again all trust com-
ponents exhibit the same trend. However, the trust values decrease monotonically over time.
Contrary to a good node, a bad node never has any chance to attain trustworthy status, with
the rapid decline of honesty and unselfishness especially contributing to a bad node’s trust
decline.Theresultthatabadnode’sstatusisalwaysuntrustworthyasdemonstratedinFig.2b
substantiatesourclaimthatourprotocolisresilientagainstwhitewashing,bad-mouthing,and
good-mouthing attacks by malicious nodes.
Nextweconsideramessageforwardingscenarioinwhichineachrunwerandomlypicka
source node s and a destination node d. The source and destination nodes picked are always
good nodes. There is only a single copy of the message initially given to node s.W el e tt h e
system run for 30min. to warm up the system and start the message forwarding afterward
in each run. During a message-passing run, every node i updates its Ti,j (t) for all j’s based
on Eq. 1. In particular, the current message carrier uses Ti,j (t) to judge if it should pass the
message to a node it encounters at time t. If the message carrier is malicious, the message
is dropped (a weak attack). If the message carrier is selfish, the message delivery continues
with 50% of the chance. A message delivery run is completed when the message is deliv-
ered to the destination node, or the message is lost before it reaches the destination node.
Data are collected for 1,500 runs from which the message delivery ratio, delay and overhead
performance measurements are calculated.
Wecomparetrust-basedroutingandconnectivity-basedroutingagainsttwobaselinerout-
ing protocols, namely, epidemic routing [14] and PROPHET [15], in terms of message
delivery ratio, delay and overhead performance metrics. Assuming sufﬁcient buffer space,
epidemic routing achieves the best performance in delivery ratio and message delay at the
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expense of the worst performance in delivery overhead (in the number of message copies
generated). Thus, epidemic routing provides the upper bound performance in delivery ratio
and message delay, and the lower bound performance in delivery overhead against which
trust-basedroutingcanbecompared.WeusePROPHETasanotherbaselineroutingprotocol
to demonstrate the effectiveness of trust-based routing protocols in all three performance
metrics.
Inepidemicrouting[14],anodeforwardsacopyofthemessagetoanynodeitencounters.
Thus, a node consumes more energy because it propagates many redundant message copies
to the network. Compared with trust-based routing and connectivity-based routing, however,
epidemic routing saves energy because it does not have the overhead of trust management.
When using the SPN model to describe a node executing epidemic routing, we adjust the
energy consumption rate to transition T_ENERGY in the “Energy” subnet of the SPN model
to account for a different energy consumption rate.
In PROPHET [15], when two nodes encounter, they exchange a delivery predictability
vector. If the delivery predictability of the current message carrier is lower than that of the
newly encountered node, then the message is passed from the current message carrier to
the newly encountered node as the next carrier. The delivery predictability is a probabilistic
metricindicatingtheencounterfrequencybetweentwonodesandisupdatedwhentwonodes
encounter each other. It is similar to the d-connectivity trust property used in our protocols
in predicting the delay of the next carrier encountering the destination node. For ease of
disposition, we will loosely refer delivery predictability as d-connectivity.P R O P H E Ti sa
multi-copy routing protocol by which each node still keeps its message copy for future trans-
mission after it sends the message to a carrier. For fair comparison, we consider a version
of PROPEHT, called PROPHET_S, where each node removes its message copy after for-
warding it to another node and will not perform any more message forwarding. The energy
consumption model of each node in PROPHET_S is similar to trust-based routing protocols
considering only d-connectivity. Therefore, in PROPHET_S the energy consumption rate
to transition T_ENERGY in the SPN model remains the same as in our trust-based routing
protocols.
Figure3showsthemessagedeliveryratioasafunctionofthepercentageofcompromised
and selfish nodes in the DTN for trust-based and connectivity-based routing protocols. For
performancecomparison,wealsoshowthedeliveryratioobtainedfromepidemicroutingand
PROPHET_S.Hereweseethattrust-basedroutingoutperformsconnectivity-basedroutingin
delivery ratio and its performance approaches the maximum achievable performance obtain-
ablefromepidemicrouting.Thisisattributedtotheabilityoftrust-basedprotocolsbeingable
to differentiate trustworthy nodes from selfish and bad nodes and select trustworthy nodes to
relaythemessage.Theresultdemonstratestheeffectivenessofincorporatingsocialtrustinto
the decision making process for DTN message routing. Among all protocols, PROPHET_S
performs the worst in message delivery ratio. In particular, PROPHET_S is significantly
worse than trust-based routing because it does not consider honesty and unselfishness for
routing decisions. PROPHET_S is also considerably worse than connectivity-based routing
because it considers only d-connectivity instead of both e-connectivity and d-connectivity,
and the message is passed to a newly encountered node as long as the new encounter’s
d-connectivity is better than that of the current message carrier. This results in a longer route
from the source node to the destination node with a higher chance to run into a malicious
node or selfish node to drop the message.
Figure 4 shows the average delay experienced per message considering only those mes-
sages delivered successfully. Here we ﬁrst note that in general connectivity-based routing
performs better than trust-based routing because connectivity-based protocols use the delay
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Fig. 4 Performance comparison in message delay
to encounter the next message carrier (e-connectivity) and the delay for the next message
carrier to encounter the destination node (d-connectivity) as the criteria to select a message
carrier. The result suggests that if delay is of primary concern, we should set the weights
associated with e-connectivity and d-connectivity (QoS trust metrics) higher than those for
honesty and unselfishness (social trust metrics), as connectivity-based routing does (by set-
ting w1 : w2 : w3 : w4 = 0.5 : 0.5 : 0 : 0). This will have the effect of trading off high
delivery ratio for low delay. Figure 4 also shows that connectivity-based routing approaches
the ideal performance obtainable from epidemic routing as the percentage of malicious and
selfishnodesincreases.WealsoobservethatingeneralPROPHET_S,beingaprotocolusing
d-connectivity for routing, performs better than trust-based routing but worse than connec-
tivity-based routing. The reason that PROPHET_S performs worse than connectivity-based
routing is that it only compares d-connectivity values of two encountering nodes for routing
decisions, which is not effective in minimizing the end-to-end delay. We note that this effect
is especially pronounced when the population of malicious and selfish nodes is low, since in
this condition PROPHET_S even performs worse than trust-based routing which considers
both e-connectivity and d-connectivity as part of its trust composition. A main reason for this
performance deterioration of PROPHET_S in message delay when the population of mali-
cious and selfish nodes is low is that in this condition most new encounters would be good
nodes,sotheeffectofconnectivitydominatestheeffectofnodemaliciousness/selfishnessfor
deciding the next message carrier, and PROPHET_S comparing d-connectivity values of two
encountering nodes for routing decisions is not effective in minimizing the end-to-end delay.
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Figure 5 compares the three protocols in message overhead measured by the number of
copies forwarded to reach the destination node for those messages successfully delivered.
We see that trust-based protocols perform comparably with connectivity-based protocols
and both protocols outperform epidemic routing and PROPHET_S considerably in message
overhead. The reason that trust-based protocols use slightly more message copies than con-
nectivity-based routing protocols is that the path being selected by trust-based protocols
may not be the most direct route in order to avoid selfish or malicious nodes. The reason
that bothtrust-based routingandconnectivity-based routingoutperform PROPHET_S,espe-
cially when the population of malicious and selfish nodes is low, is that as explained earlier
PROPHET_S tends to generate a longer route, thus resulting in more message copies being
propagated.
In summary, from Figs. 3, 4, 5, we see that trust-based protocols can effectively trade off
message delay (Fig. 4) for a significant gain in message delivery ratio (Fig. 3) and message
overhead (Fig. 5) over connectivity-based routing, epidemic routing, and PROPHET_S.
By comparing the performance of trust-based routing (w1 : w2 : w3 : w4 = 0.25 : 0.25 :
0.25 : 0.25) and connectivity-based routing (w1 : w2 : w3 : w4 = 0.5 : 0.5 : 0 : 0 ) ,w eh a v e
demonstrated the effect of parameters w1 : w2 : w3 : w4 on system performance. Figure 6
investigates the effect of β1 : β2, on performance of trust-based protocols with β1 : β2 vary-
ing from 0.5:0.5 to 0.9:0.1. We observe that as β1 : β2 increases (using a higher weight on
direct trust), the message delivery ratio increases if the population of malicious/selfish nodes
is low; otherwise, the delivery ratio decreases. This result means that when the population of
malicious/selfishnodesislow,oneshoulduseahigherratioofβ1 : β2 toimprovetheprotocol
performance.Weattributethistothefactthatwhenthepopulationofmalicious/selfishnodes
is low, it is easy for any newly encountered node to qualify as a recommender and provide a
trust recommendation toward all other nodes in the DTN. However, because of trust decay
of indirect recommendations, i.e., due to the product term in Eq. 4, the indirect trust value
received will likely decrease. Consequently, a good node may unnecessarily underestimate
the trust values of other good nodes in the system. To avoid this, it is better to place a higher
weightondirecttrustiftherearealotofgoodnodesaroundtoserveasrecommenders.Here,
we note that when given knowledge of the percentage of malicious and selfish nodes, the
sensitivity analysis performed above helps identify the best ratio of β1 : β2 to maximize the
protocol performance.
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7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have proposed and analyzed a class of trust-based routing protocols in
delay tolerant networks. The most salient feature of our protocol is that we consider not only
connectivity (QoS trust) but also honesty and unselfishness (social trust) properties into a
compositetrustmetricfordecisionmakinginDTNroutingdynamically.Weformallyproved
thatourprotocolisresilientagainstwhitewashing,bad-mouthing,andgood-mouthingattacks
by malicious nodes. We further substantiated the claim with numerical results demonstrating
that a malicious node will never attain trustworthy status. Our performance analysis results
demonstrate that by properly selecting weights associated with QoS and social trust metrics
for trust evaluation, our trust management protocols can achieve the ideal performance level
in delivery ratio and delay obtainable by epidemic routing, especially as the percentage of
malicious and selfish nodes increases. In particular, trust-based protocols that consider both
social and QoS trust can effectively trade off message delay for a significant gain in message
delivery ratio and message overhead over connectivity-based routing, epidemic routing, and
PROPHET routing protocols.
In the future, we plan to investigate other forms of message passing such as multi-copy
messageforwardingandotherformsofattacksbymaliciousnodessuchasjamming,forgery,
and Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. We also plan to consider other trust metrics such as
technical competence, betweenness centrality, similarity, and social ties (strength) [10].
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